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Non Technical Summary 
 
Free competition on markets is a major concern in competition policy. The cartelization of firms is a 
threat to free competition. One major instrument antitrust authorities have and use increasingly 
frequently is leniency programs. Leniency programs, as a device for cartel detection and cartel 
destabilization, have been implemented, or reformed, across countries since the early nineties (i.e. 
USA 1993, European Union 1996). These programs allow for cartel fine avoidance or at least for 
significant reductions of fines for a cartel member who denounces a cartel. Theoretical literature 
widely analyzed leniency programs, showing that they can be an effective tool to destabilize, detect 
and deter cartels. However, it is possible for the opposite effect to occur. For instance, an increase in 
the number of cartels may occur, due to lower expected costs of fines, which in turn stimulates 
cartelization. Empirical literature tries to analyze whether leniency programs are effective but stays 
inconclusive given that identification is derived solely from detected cartels. Therefore, it is not clear 
whether a possible success of a leniency program, which is indicated by an increasing number of 
uncovered cartels, is due to more efficient cartel prosecution or due to a greater pool of existent 
cartels. 
 
This paper attempts to answer these open questions. The efficiency of leniency programs is measured 
empirically by the impact on the competition intensity. As a widely used measure I employ the price 
cost margin. Econometric estimations based on OECD data for 23 countries and a period of 20 years 
shows positive and significant effects of leniency programs on the competition intensity. This result 
indicates that leniency programs are an effective device for cartel detection and cartel destabilization.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Freier Wettbewerb auf Märkten ist eines der wichtigen Ziele der Wettbewerbspolitik. Eine Gefahr für 
diesen freien Wettbewerb sind Kartelle. Wettbewerbsbehörden setzen zunehmend auf die 
Kronzeugenregelung, um Kartelle zu entdecken und zu destabilisieren. Solche Programme wurden in 
den frühen neunziger Jahren eingeführt oder reformiert (USA 1993, Europäische Union 1996). Diese 
Programme geben Kartellmitgliedern die Möglichkeit eine Kartellstrafe zu umgehen oder zumindest 
signifikant zu verringern, indem sie ein Kartell anzeigen. Die Wirksamkeit der Kronzeugenregelung 
als effektives Werkzeug zur Kartellerkennung und Destabilisierung wurde in der theoretischen 
Literatur weitgehend bestätigt. Es sind jedoch auch gegenteilige Effekte möglich. Zum Beispiel ist es 
möglich, dass die Einführung der Kronzeugenregelung die erwarteten Kartellstrafen insgesamt senkt 
und somit die Bildung von Kartellen stimuliert. Die empirische Literatur ist bislang unschlüssig über 
die Effektivität der Kronzeugenreglung. Es ist nicht klar, ob ein möglicher Erfolg der 
Kronzeugenregelung, gemessen durch mehr entdeckte Kartelle, eine effizientere Verfolgung oder nur 
eine größere Basis an existierenden Kartellen darstellt.  
 
Dieses Papier versucht diese noch offene Frage zu beantworten. Hierbei wird die Effizienz der 
Kronzeugenreglung empirisch anhand des direkten Einflusses auf die Wettbewerbsintensität 
gemessen. Als weit verbreitetes Maß der Wettbewerbsintensität dient die Preiskostenmarge. 
Ökonometrische Schätzungen auf Basis von OECD Daten für 23 Länder und einen Zeitraum von 20 
Jahren, zeigen, positive und signifikante Effekte der Kronzeugenregelung für die 
Wettbewerbsintensität. Daraus folgt, dass die Kronzeugenreglung ein effektives Mittel zum 
Aufdecken und Destabilisieren von Kartellen ist.  
Cartel Destabilization and Leniency Programs - Empirical
Evidence
Gordon J. KLEIN∗
ZEW Mannheim
Germany
December 21, 2010
Abstract
Leniency programs as a tool for cartel detection and cartel destabilization, have been im-
plemented since the early nineties. Theoretical work has shown that leniency programs can
be effective in enhancing cartel detection and deterrence, but these effects are not straight-
forward. It is even possible that there is an increase in the total number of cartels. Empirical
evidence shows that the positive effect on cartel deterrence seems to dominate, but cannot
provide definite evidence, as inference is derived only by detected cartels. This study uses a
more direct measure of success, the intensity of competition at the industry level of OECD
countries. An instrumental variable approach, reveals a positive effect on industries’ com-
petition intensity of leniency programs indicating effectiveness in cartel destabilization and
effective deterrence.
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1 Introduction
Free competition on markets is a major concern in competition policy. A threat to free com-
petition is the cartelization of firms. One major instrument antitrust authorities have and use
increasingly frequently are leniency programs. Leniency programs, as a device for cartel detec-
tion and cartel destabilization, have been implemented, or reformed, across countries since the
early nineties (i.e. USA 1993, European Union 1996). These programs allow for cartel fine avoid-
ance or at least for significant reductions of fines for a cartel member who reports a cartel and
should provide incentives to whistle-blowing. Theoretical literature widely analyzed leniency
programs, showing that they can be an effective tool to destabilize, detect and deter cartels
(Hinloopen 2003, Motta and Polo 2003, Spagnolo 2004, Chen and Harrington 2007). However,
negative effects are possible as well. For instance, an increase in the number of cartels may occur,
due to lower expected values of fines, which is a threat to the efficiency of leniency programs
(Motta and Polo 2003, Chen and Harrington 2007, Harrington 2008). Empirical literature tries
to analyze whether leniency programs are effective but stays inconclusive as identification is only
derived from detected cartels (Brenner 2009, Miller 2009). Therefore, it is not clear whether
a possible success of a leniency program that is indicated by more uncovered cartels is due to
more efficient cartel prosecution or due to more existent cartels.1
This paper attempts to go a step further in the identification of effectiveness of leniency pro-
grams. First, I argue that the efficiency of leniency programs can be derived empirically by
analyzing its direct impact on competition intensity. Competition intensity is an appropri-
ate measure of success of the effectiveness of leniency programs, because the ultimate goal of
leniency programs is to deter collusion and cartels that are supposed to lower competition in-
tensity. Secondly, I apply a widely used measure for competition intensity and show empirically
that leniency programs in place lead to increased competition intensity and are therefore an
effective tool for destroying or avoiding cartels. In executing these two steps, this paper adds
empirical evidence to the literature regarding the effectiveness of leniency programs.
The analysis relies on the theoretical literature and identifies the main objective of leniency
programs, to increase, or at least to sustain, the level of competition. To check the hypothesis
of leniency programs’ effectiveness, the empirical analysis uses the OECD Structural Analysis
Database (STAN), which provides information on industry level characteristics. This data allows
to build a measure of the average profitability of industries, which is an increasing function of
the price cost margin (PCM) that is used as a measure of competition intensity at the industry
level. The analysis therefore relates to the literature that analyzes effectiveness of competition
1This issue is discussed in detail in section 2.
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enhancing policies by using the same measure as, however, an endogenous variable (Griffith et
al. 2007, Griffith et al. 2010) or as a control variable (Buccirossi et al. 2009, Aghion et al. 2009). In
conjunction with supplementary data of antitrust agencies and various other OECD statistics,
an unbalanced panel comprising 23 countries over a period of 20 years is built. Besides the
information that is necessary to construct the PCM equivalent measure, it includes a great deal
of other relevant information, which allows to control for competition intensity. Supplementary
information is added from other OECD databases. In addition, data to control for policies that
may have an effect on the competition intensity is used as well.
Identification follows an approach similarly proposed by Buccirossi et al. (2009) in order to
take account of the two main sources of bias: endogeneity and omitted variable bias. First, I
control for several side factors, which have an impact on competition intensity such as imports,
business cycles, product market regulation as well as competition affecting policies. Secondly,
an instrumental variable approach using different sets of instruments to test for endogeneity and
omitted variable bias is applied. In particular, I use the implementation of leniency programs
on the OECD level as well as indicators for the political environment provided by the Manifesto
database (Klingemann et al. 2006). These different instruments allow to build an appropriate
predictor for the application of leniency programs and offer the opportunity for consistency
tests. Thirdly, to check for robustness, I provide several tests controlling for the impact of the
European supranational leniency programs, temporal persistence of leniency programs and for
the specific legal system in which leniency programs are used.
The results indicate a positive impact of leniency programs on competition intensity, with an
approximate decrease of the PCM of 3% to 5%. Moreover, the instrumental variable estimation
reveals that these results do not suffer from significant endogeneity or omitted variable bias.
Thus, national leniency programs can be denoted to work efficiently in detecting and deterring
cartels. This result is in line with previous findings, deriving identification from discovered cartels
only. Robustness checks show that the impact of leniency programs takes on average a period
of one year to become effective. In addition, I can show that leniency programs are dependent
on the legal environment where they are implemented. As a side finding, estimations cannot
verify a robust impact of the European supranational leniency programs. Finally, the overall
analysis shows that efficiency of antitrust programs in general may potentially be appropriately
estimated using competition intensity as a success measure.
The outline of the paper is the following: Section 2 provides a background discussion and
derives the hypothesis. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy, section 4 discusses the data
and provides descriptive statistics. Section 5 provides empirical results, and section 6 concludes.
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2 Literature Review and Background Discussion
Leniency programs in antitrust have formally been existent since 1978, when they were imple-
mented in the US. However, they were hardly used before a major revision by the US Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice in 1993 that allowed for fine avoidance in case of a cartel
reporting (OECD 2002). The revision’s large success in the detection of cartels led several other
countries to install similar programs (i.e. EU, UK, Korea, New Zealand). In particular, the EU
implemented a program in 1996 which was substantially revised in 2002.
Analyzing the effectiveness of those programs requires to define the objectives first. The primary
objective of leniency programs, as of antitrust laws in general, is to deter cartels or harmful
behavior (Spagnolo 2008). This primary objective can be separated into two parts: Ex ante
or general deterrence and ex post deterrence or desistance. In other words, these two derived
objectives imply prevention of cartels either before they occur or prosecution due to the detection
of already existing cartels.2
Theoretical literature provides evidence that leniency programs can be an effective tool to deter
cartels and therefore can be effective in achieving the primary objective. For instance, Spagnolo
(2004) identifies in a static model conditions for an efficient setup of leniency programs. In
particular, a program which grants exclusive reductions of fines to the first confessor only, is
identified to have the strongest deterrence effect. He finds those effects as well, albeit smaller,
in less strict programs, where second or third parties reporting a cartel receive some reductions
in sanctions as well. The analysis from Aubert et al. (2006) focuses on the incentives of rewards
and fines. These rewards are granted additionally on top of the leniency. Aubert et al. (2006)
show that reduced fines can have a positive impact on deterrence, but that programs offering
rewards, especially if individuals are included, may have an even larger impact. Motta and Polo
(2003) introduce a welfare maximizing antitrust authority, endogenizing the process of detection.
In particular, they consider the effects of leniency programs of firms on their incentives either
on collusion (ex-ante) or revealing information after collusion took place (ex-post). They show
that leniency programs may well enhance the ex-post detection and therefore desistence but
may have pro-collusive effects as expected fines may decrease. Therefore, a negative effect on
deterrence may be possible such that a leniency program leads to an increase in cartels. In a
different setting, Chen and Harrington (2007) provide an analysis using a dynamic model. They
conclude that a strong leniency program has significant deterrence effects, but softer leniency
programs may have adverse effects on deterrence. This is in line with Motta and Polo (2003).
2Spagnolo (2008) notices that the first objective, however, is by far more important as prosecution without
any deterrence leads only to deadweight due to the social costs of the prosection. However, it is expected that
there is always some deterrence effect.
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In addition, they identify a lower price in the overall pricing of cartels due to leniency programs
even if no deterrence effects are identified.
These ambiguous pro-collusive effects and anti-collusive deterrence effects are explained and
considered in a theoretical analysis by Harrington (2008) by three main channels. First, the
Deviator Amnesty Effect changes the pay-off of a firm when cheating in a cartel and lowers the
expected utility a firm has of collusion, indicating positive effects on deterrence. Secondly, the
Cartel Amnesty Effect, however, lowers the expected size of the sanctions such that the expected
utility a firm has due to collusion may increase, implying less cartels than in an environment
without leniency. The third effect is the Race to the Courthouse Effect. This effect may lower
expected values from colluding if less stricter programs, which offers some leniency to more than
the first confessor, are in place. This effect implies less collusion. In particular, the Race to
the Courthouse Effect is claimed to be a countervailing force for the Cartel Amnesty Effect.
Finally, concluding that theoretical literature provides strong evidence that leniency programs
may reduce cartel stability, Harrington (2008) mentions that strong empirical evidence is missing,
in particular due to data restrictions only on detected cartels.
There are empirical studies considering whether there has been an increase in cartel detection
and deterrence due to leniency programs. Brenner (2009) uses a sample of 61 cartel cases
investigated and prosecuted by the European Commission between 1990 and 2003. Evaluation
of efficiency distinguishes between short (information revelation, investigation and prosecution
costs reduction) and long run effects (deterrence of collusion). While there seems to be an effect
on short run effects, he cannot find a significant effect on long run effects. Miller (2009) finds
different evidence for cartel detection in the US. Directly after introducing leniency programs,
there was an increase of cartel detection in the US, which decreased later onto a level that was
below the pre-leniency detection level. This decrease is interpreted with higher cartel deterrence.
His analysis relies on hypotheses derived from a theoretical dynamic model and an empirical
analysis using cartel detection to derive inference. Moreover, his predictions rely on a single
time series and on the representability of detected cartels. The study by Miller is a large step in
providing substantial evidence that leniency programs lead to more deterrence and less collusion.
However, a final conclusion is still missing, since the identification is only derived by data from
detected cartels.
Measures like detected cartels are easily available, but this measure should be analyzed with
caution. It may capture success, such as cartel detection, but this could be the result of more
existent cartels. Moreover, a reduction in cartel detection, which may reflect less overall cartel
activity could be interpreted as a failure of leniency programs. Clearly, data on undetected
cartels is not available. This is due to the fact that cartels are per se illegal and not observable
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(Spagnolo 2008). I propose to solve this measurement problem by implementing a different, more
direct measure of success. In particular, an effective leniency program leads to a situation with
less cartels after the implementation of such a program. If we expect that cartels lead to a less
competitive outcome (for example collusive outcome vs. oligopoly outcome), the counterfactual
hypothesis for a test of effectiveness of leniency programs should be whether there is a more com-
petitive environment after the implementation of a leniency program. Therefore, effectiveness of
cartels can be analyzed by investigating the intensity of competition in possibly cartelized indus-
tries. If, ceteris paribus, competition intensity increases due to the implementation of leniency
programs, a leniency program is effective.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Empirical Modeling
The objective of this study is to analyze whether leniency programs can deter and destroy
cartels to improve the competitive situation in industries across OECD countries. The central
relationship I want to estimate is captured in the following form:
ln(Yi,t) = βLLeniencyi,t−2 + βPPoliciesi,t−2 + βX ln(Xi,t−1) + i,t (1)
with Y as a measure of the industries’ competition intensity,3 Leniency as an indicator whether
a Leniency program is in place, Policies as a vector of other competition affecting policies, X
as a vector of other control variables4 and  as the error term. The error term is defined as
i,t = ωi,t + φi,t + ui,t, with ωi,t capturing time dummies, φi,t country-industry specific fixed
effects and ui,t the remaining error. In particular, I estimate the impact of leniency programs
on the competition intensity to measure the success more directly than previous studies did.
They measured the success of leniency programs indirectly using data on detected cartels only.
A positive competition enhancing effect of leniency programs is denoted to be an indicator for
more destroyed cartels (either detected or deterred).
3All variables are defined in detail in section four.
4All continuous variables, PCM and controls in X are used as logs to give more weight to smaller values and
to reduce the impact of potential outliers.
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3.2 Identification
Identification of the efficiency of implemented leniency programs is analyzed by evaluating the
impact leniency programs have on competition intensity. Successful leniency programs should
ultimately deter competition-harming behavior that reduces overall welfare. As pointed out
before, cartels, by definition, try to cooperate in order to reduce competition to increase prices
and profits of cartel members. If, ceteris paribus, cartels are deterred, a non-cooperative market
outcome that is subject to more competition will arise. Therefore, instead of identifying deterred
cartels (ex-ante or ex-post), which is impossible for ex-ante deterred cartels and for non-detected
destabilized cartels, the analysis relies on the effect on the final goal of leniency programs, the
increase of competition intensity.5
I consider several potential biases to identify a causal link between leniency programs and
competition intensity in the estimation. For the estimation strategy, I follow similar steps and use
similar controls as Buccirossi et al. (2009).6 I try to eliminate endogeneity bias either resulting
from two-way causality or omitted variable bias. Two-way causality, however, is less of a concern,
as single, possibly collusive, industries are probably not responsible for an implementation of
a leniency program. Implementation of such policy programs take a rather long time, as the
design of laws is slow and requires effort. However, to reduce possible bias, lagged values of the
leniency indicator variable are used.7 Assuming that lagged values of the leniency variable are
uncorrelated with the error term of the estimated equation (Buccirossi et al. 2009, Griffith and
Harrison 2004) should consider two-way causality sufficiently.
Omitted variable bias is a significant concern as there are a lot of factors having an impact on
the competition intensity of an industry. The time invariant factors are captured using industry-
country specific fixed effects. Time invariant biases are partially tackled, introducing relevant
controls. In particular, I control for foreign competition, business cycles, product market regu-
lation and relevant policy programs.8 Moreover, to reduce bias from omitted variables, I use an
instrumental variable estimation to explicitly test for potential endogeneity. The instrument is
the implementation of leniency programs in other OECD countries. While there is a correlation
5As previously discussed, Spagnolo (2008) mentions that it is the ultimate goal to deter (ex-ante or ex-post)
competition reducing behavior to increase welfare.
6In contrast to my analysis, Buccirossi et al. (2009) analyze the impact of general antitrust policy on produc-
tivity. However, I use similar instruments and, where appropriate, a similar identification strategy for a similar
industry level data set.
7I use, as for all policy variables, two year lags for the leniency program. This is due to the fact that it is not
clear when within a year each policy was introduced. Therefore, a one year lag is used to ensure that all policies
are in place. One more lag is introduced, as mentioned, to reduce bias of possible two-way causality. Continuous
variables of the STAN data do only need a one year lag, as their measurement timing is parallel to the PCM.
8Many OECD countries within the sample are EU member states such that most of the policy program controls
relate to EU programs.
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between implementing leniency programs in the different OECD countries, there is no impact of
the competition intensity in one country on the implementation of leniency program in another
one. This correlation in the implementation is especially given due the cooperation on compe-
tition policies across OECD countries. To check robustness, I add other kinds of instruments,
also proposed by Buccirossi et al. (2009). These instruments are indicators of the political posi-
tion of the program of political parties which are elected into parliament. These indicators are
provided by the Manifesto data (Klingemann et al. 2006). In particular, I control for countries’
political parties’ programs regarding tendency for the role of governments’ economic planning
(market regulation, controlling economy, economic planning) and the size and importance of a
country’s welfare state (social justice, welfare state expansion, welfare state limitation). Both
sets of instruments should have explanatory power for the application of leniency programs,
however, the latter ones are more certainly exogenous to competition intensity, while the first is
potentially reversely affected by the intensity of competition.
In addition, I control for non-linearities of leniency programs, depending on the legal environment
in which they are applied (see Buccirossi et al. 2009, La Porta et al. 2008). Leniency programs
are interacted with different legal systems and it is checked whether there are dependencies.
This part of the analysis uses a pooled OLS approach and country industry dummies instead of
fixed effects, as the legal system is a time invariant factor that cannot be estimated using fixed
effects.
4 Data & Descriptive Statistics
The data is composed of several data sources. The main source is the OECD Structural Analysis
Database (STAN), which provides data on the industry level, of which I use information on the
two digit NACE classification level. The data contains information on manufacturing industries
as well as service industries.9 In includes in particular various information about value added,
exports, imports and capital formation. The data is complemented with information on leniency
programs in place, provided by national antitrust authorities. Furthermore, information on
interest rates, inflation and product market regulation from the OECD Reference Series, the
OECD Key Economic Indicators database and the OECD Product Market Regulation database,
is added. Information of relevant policy programs that is publicly available is added as well.
9Due to missing values in services industries, the analysis contains mostly information on manufacturing
industries. An overview over the considered industries is provided in the appendix.
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4.1 Competition Intensity
The dependent variable of interest to identify the efficiency of leniency programs is competition
intensity. To measure this intensity of competition within an industry, I use a measure of
average profitability. This is equivalent to the price cost margin (PCM) given the assumption
of constant economies of scale and marginal costs equal to average costs.10 Deviations lead,
therefore, to under- or over-estimations. Although this drawback is existent, Griffith et al. (2010)
claim that the PCM is certainly the best measure available for an international comparison of
several countries in an international database. Lamentably, as Boone (2008a, 2008b) points out,
the PCM is not robust to all industry constellations, especially if there is a reorganization of
the industry due to tighter competition. He shows that tighter competition leads to shifts of
production from less efficient to more efficient firms. These shifts in production may lead to a
non-linear relationship between the PCM and competition intensity. However, in this particular
analysis, the drawback is not an issue, because the interest lies in a change in the measure
due to cartels deterrence or destruction. The reference point is a collusive outcome, indicating
maximization of profits. If a firm deviates and destroys the cartel (or the cartel is detected by
the antitrust authority), this will decrease overall industry profits, regardless of possible industry
reorganization. Therefore, a reduction of the average profitability measure indicates destroyed
cartels.11
The PCM equivalent measure, average profitability, is calculated by an industry’s value added,
divided by the sum of industry’s capital costs and industry’s labor costs:
PCM <=> Average Profitabilityi,t =
V alueAddedi,t
LaborCostsi,t + CapitalCostsi,t
(2)
While there is information about value added and labor costs in the STAN data, capital costs are
not included in the data.12 To create an approximation for capital costs, the gross fixed capital
is multiplied with a capital cost factor. This capital cost factor is equal to a risk-free interest
rate plus the industries’ average capital depreciation less the countries’ inflation.13 To capture
the risk-free interest rate, I assume free capital flow and a unique world interest rate. For this,
I use the US long term interest rate, available in the OECD Reference Series. The inflation
is the country specific annual inflation rate, provided by the OECD Key Economic Indicators
database. The capital depreciation rate is not provided directly, therefore, I use the STAN data
10Compare Klette (1999) & Griffith et al. (2010). In the following I use the terms average profitability and
PCM synonymously.
11If the effect of the leniency programs on PCM is positive, this indicates that there will be more cartels.
12All values are computed using nominal prices.
13This measure has been similarly used by Griffith et al. (2010), Griffith et al. (2007) and Martins et al. (1996)
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and calculate the average capital consumption over capital employed.14 Capital deflators are
added. For the observations for which they are not available, I use cross-country means of other
countries in the same industry and year. The variable gross fixed capital is not available for all
countries in the data, however, capital formation is more widely available. Therefore, I use the
perpetual inventory method to calculate a measure of gross fixed capital.15
4.2 Main Explanatory Variable and Instruments
The main explanatory variable is the leniency program variable. Data is collected from infor-
mation provided on the homepages of national antitrust authorities. As there have been several
revisions of very heterogenous leniency programs, for EU countries, I use the information in
which year a leniency program according to the European Competition Network’s definition has
been in place.16 This ensures that heterogeneity of leniency programs observed is reduced and
that it is ensured that the first confessor receives full amnesty. The variable is constructed as a
dummy, indicating whether such a program exists at a given time. Moreover, two more dummy
variables consider if an industry is affected by the European supranational leniency programs.
Therefore, a dummy for the first EU leniency program in 1996 and its revision in 2002 are con-
sidered.17 In addition, I add a variable indicating whether the countries’ neighbors (if they are
in the OECD) introduced leniency programs. This variable controls whether there are spillover
effects. The reasoning behind is that there may be cartels across borders. This is even more the
case in European countries, which have strong interrelated economies, but applies also to other
countries. Therefore, there may be effects of cartels detected or deterred in neighbor countries.
To control for possible endogeneity, two kind of instruments for an instrumental variable estima-
tion are constructed. First, the instrument provided is the percentage of other OECD countries
having implemented a leniency program.18 Due to international cooperation regarding antitrust
policies, I suppose that the probability using a leniency program is increasing in the programs,
implemented in other countries. Second, I use a set of political variables constructed from the
14This data is only available for a small subset of countries of rather different size. To have an appropriate
rate not biased by small economies, I use the largest economy available for the data, which is Germany. Only for
industries not available in German data, I use the average of all industries available.
15As the use of the perpetual inventory method always yields to volatile capital measures depending on the
specific assumptions, all calculations are checked for whether the calculated capital measure influences results
significantly. Results are consistent if gross fixed capital, as provided in the data, is used. The perpetual inventory
method is also used similarly by Griffith et al. (2010), Griffith et al. (2007) and Buccirossi et al. (2009).
16Information is available at http//ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/model leniency programme annex1.pdf. For
the UK, I used the introduction of the legal basis for the leniency program rather than the last revisions.
17In particular, the leniency program of 1996 did not ensure full amnesty while the revision in 2002 added this
important point.
18The country for which the variable is observed is excluded inside the construction of this variable.
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Manifesto data (Klingemann et al. 2006). This data provides information on a country’s elected
political parties’ position within their corresponding electoral program regarding different cate-
gories. In general, the positions of the parties are described as the percentages of quasi-sentences
in which a position is mentioned in the overall program. To construct a measure for a country,
this information is weighted with the voters of the parties of a country in the last election.19
The categories relevant for this analysis are twofold. First, I use indicators for the political
parties’ program regarding the role of the state towards welfare programs. In particular, I use
the item Welfare State Limitation and Welfare State.20 These two indicators show a general
tendency towards a free market economy and therefore awareness of the importance of free com-
petition without cartels but are not subject to any reverse causality by the competition intensity
variable. As a second type of variables for the use as an instrument, I use the item Planned
Economy indicating how much interference by the state is desired by the political parties.21
This variable, however, is a compound variable containing information on the political parties’
position regarding market regulation, which may be subject to changes in a country’s general
competition intensity. Therefore, this variable is only valid as a robustness check.22
4.3 Further Control Variables
Several different variables are taken from the STAN database to control for variation in competi-
tion intensity. The measure used for competition intensity, the average profitability, is influenced
strongly by business cycles. To control for this source of variation, I take into account national
GDP taken from the OECD Reference Series.23 First, I estimate the linear and quadratic trend
in time and, secondly, use deviations from this trend, which indicate whether the business cycle
is either on the upper or lower part of the trend.
An important indicator for openness of an industry is import. The STAN data provides informa-
tion on this. First, absolute values of imports in an industry and secondly, import penetration,
19Other scholars, Buccirossi et al. (2009) in particular, use only the government’s parties position, but I assume
that even though the government parties can theoretically implement their position, they will consider, at least
partially, what voters consider as favorable policies, because they also seek those voters which did not vote for
them before. The 2006 data is enriched with the updates available at the Manifesto’s project homepage. In
addition, I assumed, for missing values, that a new parliament is in place for at least two years. However, all
results are robust to not imposing this assumption.
20Welfare is a compound variable of the items Social Justice and Welfare State Expansion.
21Planned Economy is a compound variable of the items Market Regulation, Economic Planning and Controlled
Economy.
22If the direct item Market Regulation is used alone, over identification tests fail in the IV estimation. The
compound variable, however, seems to be a valid instrument as the potential reverse causality is limited due to
the other factors.
23All continuous variables are measured in Billion units of national currency.
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as imports divided by the overall value added, are used. Even though the import penetration
is seemingly more informative, it reflects changes in both value added and imports. To capture
only changes in imports, I also add the absolute value as a control variable.
Regulation of markets harm free entry and competition in markets. To control for country
specific intensity on product market regulation (PMR), I use, as in Buccirossi et al. (2009),
the PMR index from the OECD PMR database. It takes into account various regulations and
barriers to international trade and investment (barriers to international trade, entrepreneurship,
public ownership of firms, etc.). This index is measured from 0 to 6 with higher numbers
indicating tighter regulation. Data is available for 1998, 2003, and 2008. As there are always 5
missing years in between, I use a linear interpolation in the years between the data points, aware
that this introduces measurement errors. This implies that an interpretation has to be careful,
though it still remains a proper, but imprecise control variable. In order to control for at least
European changes in the product market competition I add a dummy variable controlling for the
European Single Market Program in 1992. This program abolished market entry barriers and
has been shown to increase competition intensity significantly in the European Union (Griffith
et al. 2010).
Relevant for the competition intensity in the EU, I control for the EU east enlargement in 2004.
A dummy variable is created for the EU member states to take account of this structural break,
which should have an effect on competition in European Markets. Moreover, I add a dummy
for the new member states, because they should be affected stronger by the EU entrance than
the former European Members.
To control for non-linearities introduced by legal aspects, I use, as in Buccirossi et al. (2009),
controls for the legal system and construct interactions between the legal system and the le-
niency program variable. The classification of legal systems follows La Porta et al. (2008) and
subdivides legal systems into those of English, French, German and Scandinavian origin. The
intuition behind this is that legal instruments, as the leniency program, depend systematically
on the underlying legal system. Therefore, this variable allows to capture some of the general,
underlying mechanisms important for the efficiency of leniency programs.
4.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows which countries adopted leniency at what time. The first country adopting a
leniency program was the US. After this, it took five years until the next country, the UK
introduced a national leniency program in 1998 as well. However, in 1996, all European Unions
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(EU) member states have been affected by the first supra national leniency program. Beginning
with the year 2000, the adoption rate of national leniency programs increased. Importantly, the
EU revised its leniency programs substantially in 2002. However, due to the EU enlargement in
2004, some countries were affected by the EU leniency program starting then.
Table 2 provides information on the countries for which we have sufficient information within the
data to provide estimates.24 It can be observed that the distribution of observations is relatively
similar across countries, with small countries as Luxembourg, New Zealand and Portugal as well
as transformation countries as Hungary and Poland having less observations than the average.
Some OECD countries are missing in the estimation due to missing data (i.e. Australia, Slovak
Republic). Table 3 contains the industries used for estimations and shows clearly a dominance
of the manufacturing industries. This dominance is due to data availability and missing values
for service sectors.
Table 4 shows the main variables for one of the largest estimation samples. The average prof-
itability has the size of 1.23 but a rather large standard deviation. It has to be noted that
data shows, as in Griffith et al. (2010), an increasing tendency of the average profitability/PCM
over time.25 This upward trend is not a significant problem as I am interested in differentials.
Moreover, due to its upward trend, it is possible that there is an underestimation of the possibly
negative impact of leniency programs on the PCM. In 29 % of the observations,26 a national
leniency program is installed. Moreover, 56% are subject to the first EU leniency program and
31% to its revision. The OECD PMR index has an average size of 1.81. 66% of the observations
are treated by the European Single Market Program, which indicates that the data consists
mostly of EU member states. This can also be seen in the percentage of observations treated by
the EU enlargement in 2004, which is around 21%.
5 Empirical Analysis
Table 5 provides basic estimations analyzing the impact of leniency programs on competition
intensity. Column (1) shows as a baseline a pooled OLS estimation, but a significant effect
of leniency programs on the PCM cannot be revealed. As this may be due to time-invariant
unobservable heterogeneity, column(2) provides a fixed effects estimation. There is a significant
impact of the national leniency program variable on the PCM (coeff. -0.0352, std. error 0.0182).
24For Australia and the Slovak Republic, not all necessary variables are non-missing.
25This pattern has been observed by other authors as well (i.e. Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003). They propose
that a decreasing bargaining power of workers may be one reason for this.
26An observation is defined as values of a specific country within a specific year.
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National leniency programs have been complemented in the EU by supranational leniency pro-
grams (introduction in 1996 and major revision in 2002). Column (3) adds controls for the EU
program’s implementation and its major revision in 2002. Estimation shows that the impact of
the first European leniency program on the PCM is negative and significant (coeff: -0.1074, std.
error: 0.0320), as well as its revision in 2002 (coeff: -0.0558, std. error: 0.0243). The impact of
the national leniency program remains significantly negative (coeff: -0.0451, std: error 0.0181).
Column (4) adds a control for neighbor countries’ national leniency programs and identifies a
positive, significant impact (coeff: 0.0676, std. error: 0.0260). This positive coefficient indi-
cates that leniency programs seem to have an impact on the outcome even if implemented in
neighboring countries. This may be explained by less market power of foreign input provider.
The controls for the European supranational leniency programs as well as the control for the
national leniency program stays strongly significant and negative. This indicates that leniency
programs are positively correlated with a higher competition intensity.
Table 6 adds further factors supposed to have an impact on industries’ competition intensity in
order to reduce possibly omitted variable bias. Column (1) provides the baseline estimation with
the national leniency program as well as the first European leniency program being significant.
A major policy program which has had an impact on competition in European markets has
been the European Single Market Program in 1992, for which a control is added in column
(2). The effect on the PCM is negative and strongly significant and also the effect of national
leniency programs stays strongly significant (coeff: -0.0492, std. error: 0.0185). Moreover, the
previously found effect of the European Union’s program remains negative and significant for
the revision in 2002. It is not clear why the effect of the first program diminishes. This is
either due to a non-existing effect or only limited variance in the variable. Column (3) considers
the impact of the European Union’s enlargement in 2004, which increased the European single
market significantly. Moreover, the enlargement took place in the time period when national
leniency programs were implemented in the EU. Therefore, it may reduce too strong of an
effect of the national leniency program. In particular, it can be seen that the PCM in all EU
countries, was reduced clearly and significantly. However, controlling for these variables, the
significant impact of national leniency programs remains unchanged and robust (coeff: -0.0457,
std. error: 0.0194). The effect of the European’s supranational leniency program, however,
becomes insignificant. Column (4) adds the control for the countries’ particular regulation on
product markets. As expected, more product market regulation leads to a higher PCM and,
therefore, less competition on those markets. This effect is strongly significant at the 1% level,
without affecting the strongly significant impact of leniency programs on the PCM. Results
indicate that the effect of leniency programs is persistent and robust to different other factors
(coeff: -0.0452, std. error: 0.0194), which have an impact on the competition intensity.
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In order to test whether the previously observed and persistent effect of leniency programs can
be interpreted causally, I introduce an instrumental variable regression in table 7. This ap-
proach explicitly allows to test for endogenity and omitted variable bias. Column (1) offers a
basic regression with the previously used control variables. I use leniency program application in
other OECD countries as an instrument and can verify the previously found negative impact of
leniency programs on the PCM, or, in other words, its positive impact on competition intensity.
However, the effect has double the size of the OLS estimates (coeff: -0.1029 std. error: 0.0172).
The strong significance of the instrument in the first stage backs the hypothesis of the leniency
implementation in other OECD countries as a proper instrument. The Wu-Hausman test pro-
vides a p-value of 87% indicating that the instrument is not necessary and that the leniency
program variable is not endogenous. Therefore, this consistent estimation is not preferable to
OLS, as OLS is more efficient. This inefficiency also explains the less precise coefficient, which
is larger than in the OLS. Column (2) adds the first instrument of the set of the policy program
instrument regarding the political parties position regarding Welfare State. This second instru-
ment allows to perform over-identification tests on the validity of the instruments. Importantly,
the impact of leniency programs on the PCM remains negative (coeff: -0.0734 std. error: 0.0203)
and reduces the strength of the impact to approximately the same level as the OLS estimation.
The Wu-Hausman test provides a p-value of 100%, clearly indicating a non endogenous relation-
ship. The Sargan test, yielding a p-value of 59%, indicates that the instruments used are valid.
Column (3) adds the second policy program variable Welfare State Limitation. The same im-
pact of leniency programs on the PCM (coeff: -0.0700, std. error: 0.0202) and the Wu-Hausman
test indicating a non endogenous relationship. Column (4) adds the Planned Economy variable
to the instrumental variables with the Wu-Hausman test and the Sargan test confirming the
same non-endogenous relationship between leniency programs and the PCM (coeff: -0.0694, std.
error: 0.0202) as well as the validity of instruments. Taking these results into account, the
relationship between leniency program implementation and the PCM can be neither denoted to
be endogenous nor can it be denoted to face significant omitted variable bias, allowing a causal
interpretation of the preferable OLS coefficients.27 As a side finding, the estimations show that
in the first column, the revision of the European supranational leniency program is significant
but becomes insignificant afterwards. This may be explained by the imprecision of the estimates
in the first column, which indicate a non significant impact of these programs.
Table 8 analyzes the importance of time lags regarding the measurement of leniency programs.
This is an important test to check whether the impact of leniency programs is observable only
27The variable Planned Economy is not significant in the first stage if it is used together with the other
political variables, however, it is significant without using them, indicating predictive power as an instrument.
This specification is still informative as it helps to test overall validity of the instruments using the Sargan
over-identification test.
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in one period or persistently over time. Estimations use the full set of variables. In columns (1)
to (6), the leniency program variable is used first with no time lags and then increased up to 5
years of time lag. The impact on the PCM is negative and significant for the one year lag, but
seems to be stronger the more time lags are used. Results suggest that it takes a while, up to
one periods after implementation, until the leniency programs are becoming effective. This is
interesting as it shows that a learning time is necessary until firms react to the new program.
The effectiveness of leniency programs depends on a variety of specific conditions. One condition
which has a rather strong effect is the legal environment in which a leniency program is in place.
Table 9 analyzes the dependency of the legal system. As the underlying legal system is time
invariant, pooled OLS estimations are used. Column (1) introduces controls for the legal system.
As the baseline, I use the French legal system. It can be seen that on average, profits are lower
in countries with the English and Scandinavian legal system and especially in countries with
German legal systems. As in the first regression table, the pooled OLS can identify a negative,
but not significant value for the national leniency program. Column (2) introduces an interaction
term between the legal system with leniency programs. Results show that the impact of leniency
programs is still negative and becomes significant now. However, interaction effects indicate
different efficiency of leniency variables within the different legal systems. They seem to be less
efficient especially in countries with English or Scandinavian legal systems. Even though it is
not clear how efficient the pooled OLS estimation is, it seems to be clear that the institutional
factors are important. Columns (3) and (4) add additional control variables. In column (3), the
overall leniency effect gets smaller, which applies also for column (4). The patterns regarding the
interaction effects stay the same. They seem to be more efficient in countries with German and
French legal systems. These results indicate that leniency programs are actually not effective
by themselves, but dependent on the environment where they are implemented.
6 Conclusions
This study proposed to infer efficiency of leniency programs by using the PCM as a measure of
competition intensity. I argued that an increasing competition intensity indicates that leniency
programs destroy cartels (either due to detection or deterrence). Empirical analysis shows
that leniency programs have a robust and throughout negative impact on the PCM, which
is approximately between 3 % and 5 %. This implies a positive impact on the competitive
environment at the industry level. The study does not directly investigate whether this impact
is due to detection of cartels or due to deterrence of cartels, but as the number of detected
cartels is presumably not large enough to have an impact on a too large number of industries,
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this study provides evidence that cartels are destabilized and deterred. This paper takes account
of various relevant issues that may bias this finding. In the analysis, an instrumental variable
approach is used to tackle the most important identification problems’, omitted variable bias and
endogeneity. All results are robust to various instruments and finally, no proof of endogeneity can
be provided. This leads to clear support of the provided OLS estimations and backs the found
evidence for effectiveness of leniency programs in the OECD countries, indicating a causal impact
of leniency programs on competition intensity. This study therefore complements the previous
studies on this topic, tackling, however, their main drawback of incomplete identification based
on detected cartels only.
Beside this main finding, the study provides some further interesting results. I was able to
show that the effect of leniency on competition intensity becomes significant one year after
the implementation and increases over time. This indicates that leniency programs need some
time before beoming effective. As an additional result, it can be stated that the underlying
legal system in which those leniency programs can be found seem to have an important impact.
Regressions indicate some correlations that may be interesting for further research on detailed
conditions of leniency programs to work appropriately. As a side finding, correlations between
the supranational EU leniency programs and competition intensity can be found, however, these
correlations are not robust when controlling for other sources of variation in the competition
intensity.
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7 Appendix
Table 1: Leniency Implementation in OECD Countries
Country National Affected by Affected by
Leniency Program 1st EU Leniency Program 2nd EU Leniency Program
(1996) (2002)
Australia 2003
Austria 2006 x x
Belgium 2007 x x
Canada 2000
Czech Republic 2001 2004
Denmark 2007 x x
Finland 2004 x x
France 2001 x x
Germany 2006 x x
Greece 2006 x x
Hungary 2003 2004
Ireland 2001 x x
Italy 2007 x x
Japan 2006
Korea 2002
Luxembourg 2004 x x
Netherlands 2002 x x
New Zealand 2000
Norway 2004
Poland 2004 2004
Portugal 2006 x x
Slovak Republic 2001 2004
Spain 2008 x x
Sweden 2002 x x
Switzerland 2003
United Kingdom 1998 x x
United States 1993
The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic joined the EU in 2004.
Therefore, the EU leniency revision is only considered to be in place since 2004.
The definition when a leniency program is effectively in place orients
on the first reform implementing an ECN equivalent leniency program.
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Table 2: Countries and Observations
Country Observations Percent Cumulative
Austria 199 6.17 6.17
Belgium 166 5.15 11.32
Canada 111 3.44 14.76
Czech Republic 159 4.93 19.69
Denmark 200 6.20 25.89
Finland 205 6.36 32.25
France 108 3.35 35.60
Germany 188 5.83 41.43
Greece 103 3.19 44.62
Hungary 96 2.98 47.60
Ireland 135 4.19 51.78
Italy 181 5.61 57.40
Korea 70 2.17 59.57
Luxembourg 65 2.02 61.58
Netherlands 201 6.23 67.81
New Zealand 45 1.40 69.21
Norway 184 5.71 74.91
Poland 111 3.44 78.36
Portugal 83 2.57 80.93
Spain 151 4.68 85.61
Sweden 153 4.74 90.36
United Kingdom 168 5.21 95.57
United States 143 4.43 100.00
Total 3,225 100.00
Table 3: Industries and Observations
Industry Observations Percent Cumulative
Fishing, fish hatcheries, fish farms and related services 284 8.81 8.81
Other mining and quarrying 53 1.64 10.45
Food products and beverages 33 1.02 11.47
Tobacco products 99 3.07 14.54
Wearing apparel 176 5.46 20.00
Leather, leather products and footwear 234 7.26 27.26
Wood and products of wood and cork 261 8.09 35.35
Printing and publishing 213 6.60 41.95
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 5 0.16 42.11
Chemicals and chemical products 154 4.78 46.88
Rubber and plastics products 231 7.16 54.05
Other non-metallic mineral products 315 9.77 63.81
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 127 3.94 67.75
Machinery and equipment 26 0.81 68.56
Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c. 160 4.96 73.52
Radio, television and communication equipment 222 6.88 80.40
Medical, precision and optical instruments 214 6.64 87.04
Other transport equipment 160 4.96 92.00
Manufacturing n.e.c. 18 0.56 92.56
Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 26 0.81 93.36
Research and development 17 0.53 93.89
Other business activities 185 5.74 99.63
Public admin. and defence - compulsory social security 12 0.37 100.00
Total 3,225 100.00
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Table 4: Main Variables
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Average Profitability 3194 1.2251 0.5448
National Leniency Program 3225 0.2896 0.4537
1st European Leniency 3225 0.5678 0.4955
2nd European Leniency 3225 0.3057 0.4608
OECD PMR Index 3194 1.8136 0.5798
Single Market Program 3225 0.6636 0.4726
Leniency Program in Neighbor Country 3225 0.3021 0.3933
EU 2004 enlargement 3225 0.2121 0.4089
New EU member in 2004 3225 0.0378 0.1908
English Legal System 3225 0.1867 0.3897
German Legal System 3225 0.2552 0.4361
Scandinavian Legal System 3225 0.2301 0.4209
French Legal System 3225 0.3280 0.4696
GDP Trend 3225 1.5655 3.4795
Imports (as a share of value added) 3225 3.64e-09 2.41e-08
Imports (absolute) 3225 104.3493 1133.287
Imports and import penetration are measured in Billions of
national currency. Leniency in neighbor countries is measured since 1990.
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Table 5: Leniency Programs Basic Estimations
ln(PCM) ln(PCM) ln(PCM) ln(PCM)
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
National Leniency (2 lags) -0.0147 -0.0352* -0.0451** -0.0360**
(0.0315) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0182)
1st EU Leniency (2 lags) -0.1074*** -0.0840***
(0.0320) (0.0314)
2nd EU Leniency (2 lags) -0.0558** -0.0483**
(0.0243) (0.0226)
Leniency N. Country (2 lags) 0.0676***
(0.0260)
GDP Trend (in logs,1 lag) 0.0229*** 0.0145*** 0.0137*** 0.0106***
(0.0017) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0038)
Import penetration (in logs, 1 lag) -0.1546*** -0.3721*** -0.3590*** -0.3400***
(0.0178) (0.0415) (0.0396) (0.0390)
Imports (in logs, 1 lag) 0.1630*** 0.3039*** 0.2832*** 0.2578***
(0.0207) (0.0400) (0.0394) (0.0392)
Industry dummies x
Country dummies x
Time dummies x x x x
Constant -7.9222*** -14.3401*** -13.6276*** -12.7230***
(1.1346) (1.6267) (1.5744) (1.5548)
R2 0.4855 0.3653 0.3879 0.3877
Observations 3164 3164 3164 3064
Robust Standard errors are in brackets, Column 1’s clustered in year-country dimension
Significant at 1% ***, significant at 5 % ** , significant at 10% *
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Table 6: Leniency and Competition Affecting Programs
ln(PCM) ln(PCM) ln(PCM) ln(PCM)
Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
National Leniency (2 lags) -0.0360** -0.0492*** -0.0457** -0.0452**
(0.0182) (0.0185) (0.0194) (0.0194)
1st EU Leniency (2 lags) -0.0840*** -0.0345 -0.0090 -0.0093
(0.0314) (0.0257) (0.0327) (0.0325)
2nd EU Leniency (2 lags) -0.0483** -0.0515** -0.0122 -0.0203
(0.0226) (0.0228) (0.0185) (0.0181)
Leniency N. Country (2 lags) 0.0676*** 0.0484* 0.0466* 0.0465*
(0.0260) (0.0271) (0.0272) (0.0264)
Single Market Program (2 lags) -0.2088*** -0.2218*** -0.1883***
(0.0353) (0.0336) (0.0303)
EU 2004 enlargement (2 lags) -0.1283*** -0.1115***
(0.0435) (0.0423)
New EU member in 2004 (2 lags) -0.0888 -0.0601
(0.0585) (0.0553)
PMR Index (2 lags, in logs 0.0970*
(0.0587)
GDP Trend (in logs, 1 lag) 0.0106*** 0.0091** 0.0088** 0.0068**
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0035)
Import penetration (in logs, 1 lag) -0.3400*** -0.3323*** -0.3360*** -0.3179***
(0.0390) (0.0395) (0.0387) (0.0390)
Imports (in logs, 1 lag) 0.2578*** 0.2458*** 0.2541*** 0.2403***
(0.0392) (0.0403) (0.0392) (0.0394)
Time dummies x x x x
Constant -12.7230*** -12.3108*** -12.5630*** -12.1155***
(1.5548) (1.5900) (1.5523) (1.5348)
R2 0.3877 0.4054 0.4115 0.3974
Observations 3064 3064 3064 2918
Robust Standard errors are in brackets, Column 1’s clustered in year-country dimension
Significant at 1% ***, significant at 5 % ** , significant at 10% *
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Table 7: Instrumental Variable Estimation
ln(PCM) ln(PCM) ln(PCM) ln(PCM)
IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
National Leniency (2 lags) -0.1029*** -0.0734*** -0.0700*** -0.0694***
(0.0172) (0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0202)
1st EU Leniency (2 lags) -0.0215 0.0160 0.0161 0.0161
(0.0145) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0171)
2nd EU Leniency (2 lags) -0.0686*** -0.0302 -0.0303 -0.0303
(0.0161) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0189)
Leniency N. Country (2 lags) 0.0318** -0.0081 -0.0072 -0.0071
(0.0150) (0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0167)
Single Market Program (2 lags) -0.2024*** -0.3139*** -0.3130*** -0.3128***
(0.0258) (0.0838) (0.0838) (0.0838)
PMR Index (2 lags, in logs 0.1472*** 0.0628* 0.0619* 0.0617*
(0.0298) (0.0328) (0.0328) (0.0328)
GDP Trend (in logs, 1 lag) 0.0071*** 0.0138*** 0.0138*** 0.0137***
(0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Import penetration (in logs, 1 lag) -0.3283*** -0.3198*** -0.3195*** -0.3195***
(0.0133) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0162)
Imports (in logs, 1lag) 0.2496*** 0.2544*** 0.2543*** 0.2543***
(0.0167) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0207)
Time dummies x x x x
Constant -12.6408*** -11.8715*** -11.8647*** -11.8636***
(0.6084) (0.7462) (0.7460) (0.7459)
Wu-Hausman Test 0.87 1.0 1.0 1.0
Sargan Test - 0.59 0.25 0.34
Observations 2874 1977 1977 1977
Robust Standard errors are in brackets
Significant at 1% ***, significant at 5 % ** , significant at 10% *
Instruments used: Column (1) OECD Leniency, Column (2) + Welfare State
Column (3) + Welfare State Limitation, Column (4) + Planned Economy
25
T
ab
le
8:
L
en
ie
n
cy
an
d
T
im
in
g
ln
(P
C
M
)
ln
(P
C
M
)
ln
(P
C
M
)
ln
(P
C
M
)
ln
(P
C
M
)
ln
(P
C
M
)
F
ix
ed
E
ff
ec
ts
F
ix
ed
E
ff
ec
ts
F
ix
ed
E
ff
ec
ts
F
ix
ed
E
ff
ec
ts
F
ix
ed
E
ff
ec
ts
F
ix
ed
E
ff
ec
ts
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l
L
en
ie
n
cy
-0
.0
2
6
6
(0
.0
1
6
2
)
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l
L
en
ie
n
cy
(1
la
g
)
-0
.0
2
6
4
*
(0
.0
1
5
8
)
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l
L
en
ie
n
cy
(2
la
g
s)
-0
.0
4
5
2
*
*
(0
.0
1
9
4
)
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l
L
en
ie
n
cy
(3
la
g
s)
-0
.0
5
6
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
0
7
)
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l
L
en
ie
n
cy
(4
la
g
s)
-0
.0
7
5
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
1
3
)
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l
L
en
ie
n
cy
(5
la
g
s)
-0
.1
0
6
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
7
1
)
1
st
E
U
L
en
ie
n
cy
(2
la
g
s)
-0
.0
0
7
5
-0
.0
0
6
9
-0
.0
0
9
3
-0
.0
1
6
5
-0
.0
3
1
7
-0
.0
8
7
7
*
*
(0
.0
3
2
6
)
(0
.0
3
2
5
)
(0
.0
3
2
5
)
(0
.0
3
2
5
)
(0
.0
3
3
2
)
(0
.0
3
4
2
)
2
n
d
E
U
L
en
ie
n
cy
(2
la
g
s)
-0
.0
2
2
9
-0
.0
2
1
0
-0
.0
2
0
3
-0
.0
2
5
9
-0
.0
2
2
3
-0
.0
1
4
8
(0
.0
1
9
4
)
(0
.0
1
8
7
)
(0
.0
1
8
1
)
(0
.0
1
7
8
)
(0
.0
1
8
6
)
(0
.0
1
8
0
)
L
en
ie
n
cy
N
.
C
o
u
n
tr
y
(2
la
g
s)
0
.0
5
8
5
*
*
0
.0
5
3
5
*
*
0
.0
4
6
5
*
0
.0
4
2
1
0
.0
4
9
8
*
0
.0
6
6
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
6
0
)
(0
.0
2
5
7
)
(0
.0
2
6
4
)
(0
.0
2
6
4
)
(0
.0
2
5
4
)
(0
.0
2
4
2
)
S
in
g
le
M
a
rk
et
P
ro
g
ra
m
(2
la
g
s)
-0
.1
8
0
7
*
*
*
-0
.1
8
5
5
*
*
*
-0
.1
8
8
3
*
*
*
-0
.1
9
2
2
*
*
*
-0
.1
7
9
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
9
2
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
0
5
)
(0
.0
3
0
4
)
(0
.0
3
0
3
)
(0
.0
3
0
4
)
(0
.0
2
9
1
)
(0
.0
2
4
4
)
P
M
R
In
d
ex
(2
la
g
s,
in
lo
g
s
0
.0
7
9
6
0
.0
8
3
3
0
.0
9
7
0
*
0
.1
0
3
5
*
0
.0
9
3
2
0
.0
5
8
6
(0
.0
5
7
3
)
(0
.0
5
6
3
)
(0
.0
5
8
7
)
(0
.0
5
9
1
)
(0
.0
5
8
7
)
(0
.0
5
7
5
)
E
U
2
0
0
4
en
la
rg
em
en
t
(2
la
g
s)
-0
.0
9
2
4
*
*
-0
.1
0
2
2
*
*
-0
.1
1
1
5
*
*
*
-0
.1
0
1
8
*
*
-0
.0
9
2
5
*
*
-0
.0
6
9
1
*
(0
.0
3
9
0
)
(0
.0
3
9
4
)
(0
.0
4
2
3
)
(0
.0
4
0
1
)
(0
.0
3
8
4
)
(0
.0
3
5
7
)
N
ew
E
U
m
em
b
er
in
2
0
0
4
(2
la
g
s)
-0
.0
8
6
9
-0
.0
7
8
8
-0
.0
6
0
1
-0
.0
3
1
2
-0
.0
0
6
9
0
.0
6
3
2
(0
.0
5
3
8
)
(0
.0
5
4
1
)
(0
.0
5
5
3
)
(0
.0
5
5
5
)
(0
.0
5
3
6
)
(0
.0
5
5
6
)
G
D
P
T
re
n
d
(i
n
lo
g
s,
1
la
g
)
0
.0
0
6
3
*
0
.0
0
6
5
*
0
.0
0
6
8
*
*
0
.0
0
6
2
*
0
.0
0
7
4
*
*
0
.0
0
8
8
*
*
(0
.0
0
3
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
5
)
(0
.0
0
3
6
)
(0
.0
0
3
5
)
(0
.0
0
3
5
)
Im
p
o
rt
p
en
et
ra
ti
o
n
(i
n
lo
g
s,
1
la
g
)
-0
.3
1
5
6
*
*
*
-0
.3
1
5
9
*
*
*
-0
.3
1
7
9
*
*
*
-0
.3
1
9
5
*
*
*
-0
.3
2
3
0
*
*
*
-0
.3
1
8
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
9
0
)
(0
.0
3
9
0
)
(0
.0
3
9
0
)
(0
.0
3
9
0
)
(0
.0
3
9
2
)
(0
.0
4
1
4
)
Im
p
o
rt
s
(i
n
lo
g
s,
1
la
g
)
0
.2
3
6
9
*
*
*
0
.2
3
7
9
*
*
*
0
.2
4
0
3
*
*
*
0
.2
4
2
6
*
*
*
0
.2
4
4
7
*
*
*
0
.2
5
1
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
9
6
)
(0
.0
3
9
6
)
(0
.0
3
9
4
)
(0
.0
3
9
5
)
(0
.0
3
9
5
)
(0
.0
4
1
6
)
T
im
e
d
u
m
m
ie
s
x
x
x
x
x
x
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
-1
1
.9
5
6
2
*
*
*
-1
1
.9
9
1
3
*
*
*
-1
2
.1
1
5
5
*
*
*
-1
2
.2
0
9
7
*
*
*
-1
2
.3
1
3
4
*
*
*
-1
2
.2
2
1
1
*
*
*
(1
.5
4
0
2
)
(1
.5
3
9
9
)
(1
.5
3
4
8
)
(1
.5
3
3
9
)
(1
.5
3
4
7
)
(1
.6
1
7
8
)
R
2
0
.3
9
5
0
0
.3
9
4
9
0
.3
9
7
4
0
.4
0
8
5
0
.4
0
8
3
0
.3
9
7
2
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
2
9
1
8
2
9
1
8
2
9
1
8
2
8
7
4
2
8
7
6
2
7
2
5
R
o
bu
st
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
in
br
a
ck
et
s,
C
o
lu
m
n
1
’s
cl
u
st
er
ed
in
y
ea
r-
co
u
n
tr
y
d
im
en
si
o
n
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
%
*
*
*
,
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
5
%
*
*
,
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
*
26
Table 9: Leniency Programs and the Legal System
ln(PCM) ln(PCM) ln(PCM) ln(PCM)
Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
National Leniency (2 lags) -0.0147 -0.0867*** -0.0823*** -0.0519***
(0.0315) (0.0255) (0.0238) (0.0174)
English Legal System -0.9227*** -0.9322*** -1.2545*** -1.2435***
(0.0496) (0.0522) (0.0970) (0.0937)
German Legal System -1.4661*** -1.4536*** -0.8634*** -0.8575***
(0.2408) (0.2362) (0.0684) (0.0671)
Scandinavian Legal System -0.8358*** -0.8954*** -1.8812*** -1.8790***
(0.0985) (0.1023) (0.0651) (0.0648)
Eng. Legal Sys. x Leniency 0.0649** 0.0240 -0.0153
(0.0277) (0.0312) (0.0319)
Ger. Legal Sys. x Leniency -0.0216 -0.0207 -0.0676
(0.0480) (0.0599) (0.0773)
Sca. Legal Sys. x Leniency 0.2913*** 0.2602*** 0.2321***
(0.0580) (0.0520) (0.0464)
PMR Index (2 lags, in logs) 0.0692 0.0684
(0.0517) (0.0515)
Single Market Program (2 logs) -0.2123*** -0.1888***
(0.0456) (0.0524)
EU 2004 enlargement (2 lags) -0.0292 0.0294
(0.0286) (0.0236)
New EU member in 2004 (2 lags) -0.0057 0.0288
(0.0667) (0.0873)
1st EU Leniency (2 lags) -0.0034
(0.0342)
2nd EU Leniency (2 lags) -0.0660**
(0.0243)
Leniency N. Country (2 lags) 0.0563
(0.0353)
GDP Trend (in logs, 1 lag) 0.0229*** 0.0227*** 0.0214*** 0.0213***
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Import penetration (in logs, 1 lag) -0.1546*** -0.1535*** -0.1534*** -0.1528***
(0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0156) (0.0157)
Imports (in logs, 1 lag) 0.1630*** 0.1643*** 0.1646*** 0.1628***
(0.0207) (0.0202) (0.0192) (0.0199)
Industry dummies x x x x
Country dummies x x x x
Time dummies x x x x
Constant dummies -6.4561*** -6.4750*** -6.2754*** -6.2271***
(0.9089) (0.8958) (0.7649) (0.7808)
R2 0.4855 0.4908 0.4951 0.4959
Observations 3164 3164 2918 2918
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